
## **Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practice**

**Eighth Edition** 




Chapter 13

**Digital Signatures** 



# Figure 13.1 Simplified Depiction of Essential Elements of Digital Signature Process





## **Digital Signature Properties**

- It must verify the author and the date and time of the signature
- It must authenticate the contents at the time of the signature
- It must be verifiable by third parties to resolve disputes



### **Attacks**

### Key-only attack

C only knows A's public key

### Known message attack

C is given access to a set of messages and their signatures

### Generic chosen message attack

 C chooses a list of messages before attempting to break A's signature scheme, independent of A's public key; C then obtains from A valid signatures for the chosen messages

### Directed chosen message attack

 Similar to the generic attack, except that the list of messages to be signed is chosen after C knows A's public key but before any signatures are seen

### Adaptive chosen message attack

 C may request from A signatures of messages that depend on previously obtained message-signature pairs



## **Forgeries**

### Total break

C determines A's private key

### Universal forgery

 C finds an efficient signing algorithm that provides an equivalent way of constructing signatures on arbitrary messages

### Selective forgery

 C forges a signature for a particular message chosen by C

### Existential forgery

 C forges a signature for at least one message; C has no control over the message



## Digital Signature Requirements

- The signature must be a bit pattern that depends on the message being signed
- The signature must use some information unique to the sender to prevent both forgery and denial
- It must be relatively easy to produce the digital signature
- It must be relatively easy to recognize and verify the digital signature
- It must be computationally infeasible to forge a digital signature, either by constructing a new message for an existing digital signature or by constructing a fraudulent digital signature for a given message
- It must be practical to retain a copy of the digital signature in storage



## **Direct Digital Signature**

- Refers to a digital signature scheme that involves only the communicating parties
  - It is assumed that the destination knows the public key of the source
- Confidentiality can be provided by encrypting the entire message plus signature with a shared secret key
  - It is important to perform the signature function first and then an outer confidentiality function
  - In case of dispute some third party must view the message and its signature
- The validity of the scheme depends on the security of the sender's private key
  - If a sender later wishes to deny sending a particular message, the sender can claim that the private key was lost or stolen and that someone else forged his or her signature
  - One way to thwart or at least weaken this ploy is to require every signed message to include a timestamp and to require prompt reporting of compromised keys to a central authority



## **ElGamal Digital Signature**

- Scheme involves the use of the private key for encryption and the public key for decryption
- Global elements are a prime number q and a, which is a primitive root of q
- Use private key for encryption (signing)
- Uses public key for decryption (verification)
- Each user generates their key
  - Chooses a secret key (number):  $1 < x_A < q-1$
  - Compute their public key:  $y_A = a^{xA} \mod q$



## Schnorr Digital Signature

- Scheme is based on discrete logarithms
- Minimizes the message-dependent amount of computation required to generate a signature
  - Multiplying a 2n-bit integer with an n-bit integer
- Main work can be done during the idle time of the processor
- Based on using a prime modulus p, with p − 1 having a prime factor q of appropriate size
  - Typically p is a 1024-bit number, and q is a 160-bit number




## **NIST Digital Signature Algorithm**

- Published by NIST as Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS 186
- Makes use of the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)
- The latest version, FIPS 186-3, also incorporates digital signature algorithms based on RSA and on elliptic curve cryptography





## Figure 13.2 Two Approaches to Digital Signatures





## Figure 13.3 The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)

### **Global Public-Key Components**

- p prime number where  $2^{L-1}$  $for <math>512 \le L \le 1024$  and L a multiple of 64; i.e., bit length L between 512 and 1024 bits in increments of 64 bits
- q prime divisor of (p − 1), where 2<sup>N-1</sup> < q < 2<sup>N</sup> i.e., bit length of N bits
- g = h(p-1)/q is an exponent mod p, where h is any integer with 1 < h < (p-1)such that  $h^{(p-1)/q} \mod p > 1$

### User's Private Key

x random or pseudorandom integer with 0 < x < q

### User's Public Key

$$y = g^x \mod p$$

#### User's Per-Message Secret Number

k random or pseudorandom integer with 0 < k < q

### Signing

$$r = (g^k \mod p) \mod q$$

$$s = [k^{-1} (H(M) + xr)] \mod q$$
Signature =  $(r, s)$ 

### Verifying

$$w = (s')^{-1} \mod q$$

$$u_1 = [H(M')w] \mod q$$


$$u_2 = (r')w \mod q$$


$$v = [(g^{u1}y^{u2}) \mod p] \mod q$$

$$TEST; v = r'$$

$$M$$
 = message to be signed  
 $H(M)$  = hash of M using SHA-1  
 $M', r', s'$  = received versions of  $M, r, s$ 

## Figure 13.4 DSA Signing and Verifying








## Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)

- Four elements are involved:
  - All those participating in the digital signature scheme use the same global domain parameters, which define an elliptic curve and a point of origin on the curve
  - A signer must first generate a public, private key pair
  - A hash value is generated for the message to be signed; using the private key, the domain parameters, and the hash value, a signature is generated
  - To verify the signature, the verifier uses as input the signer's public key, the domain parameters, and the integer s; the output is a value v that is compared to r; the signature is verified if the v = r



## Figure 13.5 ECDSA Signing and Verifying





### **RSA-PSS**

- RSA Probabilistic Signature Scheme
- Included in the 2009 version of FIPS 186
- Latest of the RSA schemes and the one that RSA Laboratories recommends as the most secure of the RSA schemes
- For all schemes developed prior to PSS it has not been possible to develop a mathematical proof that the signature scheme is as secure as the underlying RSA encryption/decryption primitive
- The PSS approach was first proposed by Bellare and Rogaway
- This approach, unlike the other RSA-based schemes, introduces a randomization process that enables the security of the method to be shown to be closely related to the security of the RSA algorithm itself




## **Mask Generation Function (MGF)**

- Typically based on a secure cryptographic hash function such as SHA-1
  - Is intended to be a cryptographically secure way of generating a message digest, or hash, of variable length based on an underlying cryptographic hash function that produces a fixed-length output




## Figure 13.6 RSA-PSS Encoding





### Figure 13.7 RSA-PSS EM Verification





### **Summary**

- Present an overview of the digital signature process
- Understand the ElGamal digital signature scheme
- Understand the Schnorr digital signature scheme
- Understand the NIST digital signature scheme
- Compare and contrast the NIST digital signature scheme with the ElGamal and Schnorr digital signature schemes
- Understand the elliptic curve digital signature scheme
- Understand the RSA-PSS digital signature scheme





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