
**CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES:
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION**

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**RESOURCE MOBILIZATION AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS:
A Partial Theory**

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Past analysis of social movements and social movement organizations has normally assumed a close link between the frustrations or grievances of a collectivity of actors and the growth and decline of movement activity. Questioning the theoretical centrality of this assumption directs social movement analysis from its heavy emphasis upon the social psychology of social movement participants; it can then be more easily integrated with structural theories of social process. This chapter presents a set of concepts and related propositions drawn from a resource mobilization perspective. It emphasizes the variety and sources of resources, the relationship of social movements to the media, authorities, and other parties, and the interaction among movement organizations. Propositions are developed to explain social movement activity at several levels of inclusiveness—the social movement sector, the social movement industry, and the social movement organization.

For quite some time a hiatus existed in the study of social movements in the United States. In the course of activism leaders of movements here and abroad attempted to

enunciate general principles concerning movement tactics and strategy and the dilemmas that arise in overcoming hostile environments. Such leaders as Mao, Lenin, Saul Alinsky, and Martin Luther King attempted in turn to develop principles and guidelines for action. The theories of activists stress problems of mobilization, the manufacture of discontent, tactical choices, and the infrastructure of society and movements necessary for success. At the same time sociologists, with their emphasis upon structural strain, generalized belief, and deprivation, largely have ignored the ongoing problems and strategic dilemmas of social movements.

Recently a number of social scientists have begun to articulate an approach to social movements, here called the resource mobilization approach, that begins to take seriously many of the questions that have concerned social movement leaders and practical theorists. Without attempting to produce handbooks for social change (or its suppression), the new approach deals in general terms with the dynamics and tactics of social movement growth, decline, and change. As such, it provides a corrective to the practical theorists, who naturally are most concerned with justifying their own tactical choices, and it also adds realism, power, and depth to the truncated research on and analysis of social movements offered by many social scientists.

The resource mobilization approach emphasizes both societal support and constraint of social movement phenomena. It examines the variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate movements. The shift in emphasis is evident in much of the work published recently in this area (J. Wilson, 1973; Tilly, 1973, 1975; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly, 1975; Gamson, 1975; Oberschall, 1973; Lipsky, 1968; Downs, 1972; McCarthy and Zald, 1973). The new approach depends more upon political sociology and economic theories than upon the social psychology of collective behavior.¹

This chapter presents a set of concepts and propositions that articulate the resource mobilization approach. It is a partial theory because it takes as given, as constants, certain components of a complete theory. The propositions are heavily based upon the American case, so that the impact of societal differences in development and political structure on social movements is unexplored, as are differences in levels and types of mass communication of the left, ignoring, for the most part, organizations of the right.

The main body of the chapter defines our central concepts and presents illustrative hypotheses about the social movement sector (SMS), social movement industries (SMI), and social movement organizations (SMO). However, since we view this approach as a departure from the main tradition in social movement analysis, it will be useful first to clarify what we see as the limits of that tradition.

Perspectives Emphasizing Deprivation and Beliefs

Without question the three most influential approaches to an understanding of social movement phenomena for American sociol-

ogists during the past decade are those of Gurr (1970) Turner and Killian (1972), and Smelser (1963).² They differ in a number of respects. But, most important, they have in common strong assumptions that shared grievances and generalized beliefs (loose ideologies) about the causes and possible means of reducing grievances are important preconditions for the emergence of a social movement in a collectivity. An increase in the extent or intensity of grievances or deprivation and the development of ideology occur prior to the emergence of social movement phenomena. Each of these perspectives holds that discontent produced by some combination of structural conditions is a necessary if not sufficient condition to an account of the rise of any specific social movement phenomenon. Each, as well, holds that before collective action is possible within a collectivity a generalized belief (or ideological justification) is necessary concerning at least the causes of the discontent and, under certain conditions, the modes of redress. Much of the empirical work that has followed and drawn upon these perspectives has emphasized even more heavily the importance of understanding the grievances and deprivation of participants. (Indeed, scholars following Gurr, Smelser, and Turner and Killian often ignore structural factors, even though the authors mentioned have been sensitive to broader structural and societal influences, as have some others.)³

Recent empirical work, however, has led us to doubt the assumption of a close link between preexisting discontent and generalized beliefs in the rise of social movement phenomena.⁴ A number of studies have shown little or no support for expected relationships between objective or subjective deprivation and the outbreak of movement phenomena and willingness to participate in collective action (Snyder and Tilly, 1972; Mueller, 1972; Bowen et al., 1968; Crawford and Naditch, 1970). Other studies have

failed to support the expectation of a generalized belief prior to outbreaks of collective behavior episodes or initial movement involvement (Quarantelli and Hundley, 1975; Marx, 1970; Stallings, 1973). Partially as a result of such evidence, in discussing revolution and collective violence Charles Tilly is led to argue that these phenomena flow directly out of a population's central political processes instead of expressing momentarily heightened diffuse strains and discontents within a population (Tilly, 1973).

Moreover, the heavy focus upon the psychological state of the mass of potential movement supporters within a collectivity has been accompanied by a lack of emphasis upon the processes by which persons and institutions from outside of the collectivity under consideration become involved; for instance, northern white liberals in the southern civil rights movement, or Soviets and Cubans in Angola. Although earlier perspectives do not exclude the possibilities of such involvement on the part of outsiders, they do not include such processes as central and enduring phenomena to be used in accounting for social movement behavior.

The ambiguous evidence of some of the research on deprivation, relative deprivation, and generalized belief has led us to search for a perspective and a set of assumptions that lessen the prevailing emphasis upon grievances. We want to move from a strong assumption about the centrality of deprivation and grievances to a weak one, which makes them a component—indeed, sometimes a secondary component—in the generation of social movements.

We are willing to assume (Turner and Killian [1972] call the assumption extreme) "that there is always enough discontent in any society to supply the grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some

established elite group" (p. 251). For some purposes we go even further: grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations.

We adopt a weak assumption not only because of the negative evidence (already mentioned) concerning the stronger one but also because in some cases recent experience supports the weaker one. For instance, the senior citizens who were mobilized into groups to lobby for Medicare were brought into groups only after legislation was before Congress and the American Medical Association had claimed that senior citizens were not complaining about the medical care available to them (Rose, 1967). Senior citizens were organized into groups through the efforts of a lobbying group created by the AFL-CIO. No doubt the elderly needed money for medical care. However, what is important is that the organization did not develop directly from that grievance but very indirectly through the moves of actors in the political system. Entertaining a weak assumption leads directly to an emphasis upon mobilization processes. Our concern is the search for analytic tools to account adequately for the processes.

Resource Mobilization

The resource mobilization perspective adopts as one of its underlying problems Olson's (1965) challenge: since social movements deliver collective goods, few individuals will "on their own" bear the costs of working to obtain them. Explaining collective behavior requires detailed attention to the selection of incentives, cost-reducing mechanisms or structures, and career benefits that lead to collective behavior (see, especially, Oberschall, 1973).

Several emphases are central to the perspective as it has developed.⁵ First, study of

the aggregation of resources (money and labor) is crucial to an understanding of social movement activity. Because resources are necessary for engagement in social conflict, they must be aggregated for collective purposes. Second, resource aggregation requires some minimal form of organization, and hence, implicitly or explicitly, we focus more directly upon social movement organizations than those working within the traditional perspective do. Third, in accounting for a movement's successes and failures one finds an explicit recognition of the crucial importance of involvement on the part of individuals and organizations from outside the collectivity a social movement represents. Fourth, an explicit, if crude, supply-and-demand model is sometimes applied to the flow of resources toward and away from specific social movements. Finally, there is a sensitivity to the importance of costs and rewards in explaining individual and organizational involvement in social movement activity. Costs and rewards are centrally affected by the structure of society and the activities of authorities.

We can summarize the emerging perspective by contrasting it with the traditional one as follows:

Support Base

Traditional Social movements are based upon aggrieved populations that provide the necessary resources and labor. Although case studies may mention external supports, they are not incorporated as central analytic components.

Resource Mobilization Social movements may or may not be based upon the grievances of the presumed beneficiaries. Conscience constituents, individual and organizational, may provide major sources of support. And in some cases supporters—

those who provide money, facilities, and even labor—may have no commitment to the values that underlie specific movements.

Strategy and Tactics

Traditional Social movement leaders use bargaining, persuasion, or violence to influence authorities to change. Choices of tactics depend upon prior history of relations with authorities, relative success of previous encounters, and ideology. Tactics are also influenced by the oligarchization and institutionalization of organizational life.

Resource Mobilization The concern with interaction between movements and authorities is accepted, but it is also noted that social movement organizations have a number of strategic tasks. These include mobilizing supporters, neutralizing and/or transforming mass and elite publics into sympathizers, and achieving change in targets. Dilemmas occur in the choice of tactics, since what may achieve one aim may conflict with behavior aimed at achieving another. Moreover, tactics are influenced by interorganizational competition and cooperation.

Relation to Larger Society

Traditional Case studies have emphasized the effects of the environment upon movement organizations, especially with respect to goal change, but have ignored, for the most part, ways in which such movement organizations can utilize the environment for their own purposes (see Perrow, 1972). This situation has probably been largely a result of the lack of comparative organizational focus inherent in case studies. In analytical studies emphasis is upon the extent of hostility or toleration in the larger society. Society and culture are treated as descriptive historical context.

Resource Mobilization Society provides the infrastructure that social movement industries and other industries utilize. The aspects utilized include communication media and expense, levels of affluence, degree of access to institutional centers, pre-existing networks, and occupational structure and growth.

Theoretical Elements

Having sketched the emerging perspective, our task now is to present a more precise statement of it. In this section we offer our most general concepts and definitions.

A *social movement* is a set of opinions and beliefs in a population representing preferences for changing some elements of the social structure or reward distribution, or both, of a society.⁶ A *countermovement* is a set of opinions and beliefs in a population opposed to a social movement. As is clear, we view social movements as nothing more than preference structures directed toward social change, very similar to what political sociologists would term *issue cleavages*. (Indeed, the process we are exploring resembles what political scientists term *interest aggregation*, except that we are concerned with the margins of the political system rather than with existing party structures.)

The distribution of preference structures can be approached in several ways. Who holds the beliefs? How intensely are they held? In order to predict the likelihood of preferences being translated into collective action, the mobilization perspective focuses upon the preexisting organization and integration of those segments of a population that share preferences. Oberschall (1973) has presented an important synthesis of past work on the preexisting organization of preference structures, emphasizing the opportunities and costs for expression of preferences for movement leaders and fol-

lowers. Social movements whose related populations are highly organized internally (either communally or associationally) are more likely than are others to spawn organized forms.

A *social movement organization* (SMO) is a complex, or formal, organization that identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals.⁷ If we think of the recent civil rights movement in these terms, the social movement contained a large portion of the population that held preferences for change aimed at "justice for black Americans" and a number of SMOs such as the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). These SMOs represented and shaped the broadly held preferences and diverse sub-preferences of the social movement.

All SMOs that have as their goal the attainment of the broadest preferences of a social movement constitute a *social movement industry* (SMI)—the organizational analogue of a social movement. A conception paralleling that of SMI, used by Von Eschen, Kirk, and Pinard (1971), the "organizational substructure of disorderly politics," has aided them in analyzing the civil rights movement in Baltimore. They demonstrate that many of the participants in a 1961 demonstration sponsored by the local chapter of CORE were also involved in the NAACP, the SCLC, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) or the Young People's Socialist Alliance (YPSA). These organizations either were primarily concerned with goals similar to those of CORE or included such goals as subsets of broader ranges of social change goals. (The concept employed by Von Eschen et al. is somewhat broader than ours, however, as will be seen below.)

Definitions of the central term, *social movement* (SM), typically have included both elements of preference and organized action for change. Analytically separating these components by distinguishing between an SM and an SMI has several advantages. First, it emphasizes that SMs are never fully mobilized. Second, it focuses explicitly upon the organizational component of activity. Third, it recognizes explicitly that SMs are typically represented by more than one SMO. Finally, the distinction allows the possibility of an account of the rise and fall of SMs that is not fully dependent upon the size of an SM or the intensity of the preferences within it.

Our definitions of SM, SMI, and SMO are intended to be inclusive of the phenomena analysts have included in the past. The SMs can encompass narrow or broad preferences, millenarian and evangelistic preferences, and withdrawal preferences. Organizations may represent any of these preferences.

The definition of SMI parallels the concept of industry in economics. Note that economists, too, are confronted with the difficulty of selecting broader or narrower criteria for including firms (SMOs) within an industry (SMI). For example, one may define a furniture industry, a sitting-furniture industry, or a chair industry. Close substitutability of product usage and, therefore, demand interdependence is the theoretical basis for defining industry boundaries. Economists use the *Census of Manufacturers* classifications, which are not strictly based on demand interdependence. For instance, on the one hand various types of steel are treated as one industry, though the types (rolled, flat, wire) are not substitutable. On the other hand, some products are classified separately (e.g., beet sugar, cane sugar) when they are almost completely substitutable (Bain, 1959, pp. 111-18).

Given our task, the question becomes how to group SMOs into SMIs. This is a difficult problem because particular SMOs may be broad or narrow in stated target goals. In any set of empirical circumstances the analyst must decide how narrowly to define industry boundaries. For instance, one may speak of the SMI that aims at liberalized alterations in laws, practices, and public opinion concerning abortion. This SMI would include a number of SMOs. But these SMOs may also be considered part of the broader SMI commonly referred to as the "women's liberation movement," or they could be part of the "population control movement." In the same way, the pre-1965 civil rights movement could be considered part of the broader civil liberties movement.

Economists have dealt with this difficulty by developing categories of broader inclusiveness, sometimes called *sectors*. Even this convention, however, does not confront the difficulties of allocating firms (SMOs) that are conglomerates, those that produce products across industries and even across sectors. In modern America there are a number of SMOs that may be thought of as conglomerates in that they span, in their goals, more narrowly defined SMIs. Common Cause, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) and the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) are best treated in these terms as each pursues a wide variety of organizational goals that can only with difficulty be contained within even broadly defined SMIs.⁸ The *social movement sector* (SMS) consists of all SMIs in a society no matter to which SM they are attached. (The importance of this distinction will become apparent below.)

Let us now turn to the resource mobilization task of an SMO. Each SMO has a set of *target goals*, a set of preferred changes toward which it claims to be working. Such goals may be broad or narrow, and they are

the characteristics of SMOs that link them conceptually with particular SMs and SMIs. The SMOs must possess resources, however few and of whatever type, in order to work toward goal achievement. Individuals and other organizations control resources, which can include legitimacy, money, facilities, and labor.

Although similar organizations vary tremendously in the efficiency with which they translate resources into action (see Katz, 1974), the amount of activity directed toward goal accomplishment is crudely a function of the resources controlled by an organization. Some organizations may depend heavily upon volunteer labor, while others may depend upon purchased labor. In any case, resources must be controlled or mobilized before action is possible.

From the point of view of an SMO the individuals and organizations that exist in a society may be categorized along a number of dimensions. For the appropriate SM there are adherents and nonadherents. *Adherents* are those individuals and organizations that believe in the goals of the movement. The *constituents* of an SMO are those providing resources for it.

At one level the resource mobilization task is primarily that of converting adherents into constituents and maintaining constituent involvement. However, at another level the task may be seen as turning nonadherents into adherents. Ralph Turner (1970) uses the term *bystander public* to denote those nonadherents who are not opponents of the SM and its SMOs but who merely witness social movement activity. It is useful to distinguish constituents, adherents, bystander publics, and opponents along several other dimensions. One refers to the size of the resource pool controlled, and we shall use the terms *mass* and *elite* to describe crudely this dimension. Mass constituents, adherents, bystander publics, and

opponents are those individuals and groups controlling very limited resource pools. The most limited resource pool individuals can control is their own time and labor. Elites are those who control larger resource pools.⁹

Each of these groups may also be distinguished by whether it will benefit directly from the accomplishment of SMO goals. Some bystander publics, for instance, may benefit directly from the accomplishment of organizational goals, even though they are not adherents of the appropriate SM. To mention a specific example, women who oppose the preferences of the women's liberation movement or have no relevant preferences might benefit from expanded job opportunities for women pursued by women's groups. Those who would benefit directly from SMO goal accomplishment we shall call *potential beneficiaries*.¹⁰

In approaching the task of mobilizing resources an SMO may focus its attention upon adherents who are potential beneficiaries and/or attempt to convert bystander publics who are potential beneficiaries into adherents. It may also expand its target goals in order to enlarge its potential beneficiary group. Many SMOs attempt to present their goal accomplishments in terms of broader potential benefits for ever-wider groupings of citizens through notions of a better society, and so on (secondary benefits). Finally, an SMO may attempt to mobilize as adherents those who are not potential beneficiaries. *Conscience adherents* are individuals and groups who are part of the appropriate SM but do not stand to benefit directly from SMO goal accomplishment. *Conscience constituents* are direct supporters of an SMO who do not stand to benefit directly from its success in goal accomplishment.¹¹

William Gamson (1975) makes essentially the same distinction, calling groups with goals aimed at helping nonconstituents

universalistic and those whose beneficiaries and constituents are identical, *nonuniversalistic*. Gamson concludes, however, that this distinction is not theoretically important, since SMOs with either type of constituents have identical problems in binding them to the organization. It is not more "irrational," in Olson's sense, to seek change in someone else's behalf than in one's own, and in both cases commitment must be gained by other means than purposive incentives. The evidence presented by Gamson suggests that this dimension does not bear much relationship to SMO success in goal accomplishment or in the attainment of legitimacy. We argue below, however, that the distinction should be maintained: it summarizes important attachments and social characteristics of constituents. The problems of SMOs with regard to binding beneficiary and conscience constituents to the organization are different, not with regard to the stakes of individual involvement relative to goal accomplishment (the Olson problem) but with regard to the way constituents are linked to each other and to other SMOs, organizations, and social institutions (see also J. Q. Wilson, 1973).

An SMO's potential for resource mobilization is also affected by authorities and the delegated agents of *social control* (e.g., the police). While authorities and agents of control groups do not typically become constituents of SMOs, their ability to frustrate (normally termed *social control*) or to enable resource mobilization are of crucial importance. Their action affects the readiness of bystanders, adherents, and constituents to alter their own status and commitment. And they themselves may become adherents and constituents. Because they do not always act in concert, Marx (1974) makes a strong case that authorities and delegated agents of control need to be analyzed separately.

The partitioning of groups into mass or elite and conscience or beneficiary bystander

publics, adherents, constituents, and opponents allows us to describe more systematically the resource mobilization styles and dilemmas of specific SMOs. It may be, of course, to the advantage of an SMO to turn bystander publics into adherents. But since SMO resources are normally quite limited, decisions must be made concerning the allocation of these resources, and converting bystander publics may not aid in the development of additional resources. Such choices have implications for the internal organization of an SMO and the potential size of the resource pool that can ultimately be mobilized. For instance, an SMO that has a mass beneficiary base and concentrates its resource mobilization efforts toward mass beneficiary adherents is likely to restrict severely the amount of resources it can raise. Elsewhere (McCarthy and Zald, 1973) we have termed an SMO focusing upon beneficiary adherents for resources a *classical SMO*. Organizations that direct resource appeals primarily toward conscience adherents tend to utilize few constituents for organizational labor, and we have termed such organizations *professional SMOs*.

Another pattern of resource mobilization and goal accomplishment can be identified from the writings of Lipsky (1968) and Bailis (1974). It depends upon the interactions among beneficiary constituency, conscience adherents, and authorities. Typical of this pattern is an SMO with a mass beneficiary constituency that would profit from goal accomplishment (for instance, the Massachusetts Welfare Rights Organization) but that has few resources. Protest strategies draw attention and resources from conscience adherents to the SMO fighting on behalf of such mass groups and may also lead conscience elites to legitimate the SMO to authorities. As a result of a similar pattern, migrant farmworkers benefited from the transformation of authorities into adherents (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977).

But an SMO does not have complete freedom of choice in making the sorts of decisions to which we have alluded. Such choices are constrained by a number of factors, including the preexisting organization of various segments of the SM, the size and diversity of the SMI of which it is a part, and the competitive position of the SMS (McCarthy and Zald, 1974; Zald and McCarthy, 1974). Also, of course, the ability of any SMO to garner resources is shaped by important events such as war, broad economic trends, and natural disasters.

The Elements Applied: Illustrative Hypotheses

Let us proceed to state hypotheses about the interrelations among the social structure, the SMS, SMIs, and SMOs. Occasionally, we introduce specifying concepts. Because the levels of analysis overlap, the subheadings below should be viewed as rough organizing devices rather than analytic categories.

Resources, the SMS, and the Growth of SMIs

Over time, the relative size of the SMS in any society may vary significantly. In general it will bear a relationship to the amount of wealth in a society. Hence:

Hypothesis 1: As the amount of discretionary resources of mass and elite publics increases, the absolute and relative amount of resources available to the SMS increases.

This hypothesis is more of an orienting postulate than a directly testable hypothesis, but it is central to our perspective. And some related supporting evidence can be given.

By *discretionary resources* we mean time and money that can easily be reallocated, the

opposite of fixed and enduring commitments of time and money. In any society the SMS must compete with other sectors and industries for the resources of the population. For most of the population the allocation of resources to SMOs is of lower priority than allocation to basic material needs such as food and shelter. It is well known that the proportion of income going to food and shelter is higher for low-income families, while the proportion of income going to savings and recreation increases among high-income families (Samuelson, 1964). The SMOs compete for resources with entertainment, voluntary associations, and organized religion and politics.

There is cross-sectional evidence that the higher the income, the larger the average gift to charitable activities and the greater the proportion of total income given (see Morgan, Dye, and Hybels, 1975; U.S. Treasury Department, 1965). Moreover, Morgan et al. (1975) show that (1) the higher the education, the more likely the giving of time, and (2) people who give more time to volunteer activities also give more money. As the total amount of resources increases, the total amount available to the SMS can be expected to increase, even if the sector does not increase its relative share of the resource pool. However, as discretionary resources increase relative to total societal resources, the SMS can be expected to gain a larger proportional share (see U.S. Treasury [1965], which shows a long-term secular increase in charitable giving). This argument is based upon our belief that, except in times of crisis, the SMS is a low priority competitor for available resources—it benefits from the satiation of other wants.¹²

Of course, the validity of this hypothesis depends upon a *ceteris paribus* proviso. What might the other factors be? First, the existing infrastructure, what Smelser (1963) terms *structural conduciveness*, should affect the total growth of the SMS. Means of

communication, transportation, political freedoms, and the extent of repression by agents of social control, all of which may affect the costs for any individual or organization allocating resources to the SMS, serve as constraints on or facilitators of the use of resources for social movement purposes. Also, the technologies available for resource accumulation should affect the ability of SMOs within the sector to mobilize resources. For instance, the advent of mass-mailing techniques in the United States has dramatically affected the ability of the SMS to compete with local advertising in offering a product to consumers. The organization of the SMIs will support or hinder the growth of the sector as additional resources become available. The greater the range of SMOs, the more different "taste" preferences can be transformed into constituents.

Hypothesis 2: The greater the absolute amount of resources available to the SMS, the greater the likelihood that new SMIs and SMOs will develop to compete for these resources.

This and the previous proposition contain the essence of our earlier analysis (McCarthy and Zald, 1973). That study accounts in part for the proliferation in SMOs and SMIs in the 1960s in the United States by demonstrating both the relative and the absolute increases of resources available to the SMS. The major sources of increase in financial resources were charitable giving among mass and elite adherents, as well as government, church, foundation, and business giving among organizational adherents.

These two propositions attempt to account for the total growth of the SMS. They ignore variations in the taste for change over time. They imply nothing about which SMI will reap the benefits of sector expansion. Nor do they imply what types of

SMOs will lead the growth of an expanding SMI. They explicitly ignore the relationship between the size of the SMS and the intensities of preferences within an SM.

Parallel hypotheses could be stated for the relationship of resources among different categories of SM adherents and SM growth. For instance:

Hypothesis 3: Regardless of the resources available to potential beneficiary adherents, the larger the amount of resources available to conscience adherents the more likely the development of SMOs and SMIs that respond to preferences for change.

The importance of this hypothesis in our scheme hinges upon the growing role of conscience constituents in American social movements. First, the greater the discretionary wealth controlled by individuals and organizations the more likely it is that some of that wealth will be made available to causes beyond the direct self-interest of the contributor. An individual (or an organization) with large amounts of discretionary resources may allocate resources to personal comfort and to the advancement of some group of which he or she is not a member. Second, those who control the largest share of discretionary resources in any society are also those least likely to feel discontent concerning their own circumstances.¹³

In a sense, Hypothesis 3 turns Olson (1965) on his head. Though it may be individually irrational for any individual to join an SMO that already fights on behalf of his preferences, the existence of an SM made up of well-heeled adherents calls out to the entrepreneur of the cause to attempt to form a viable organization (cf. Salisbury, 1969). To the extent to which SM beneficiary adherents lack resources, SMO support, if it can be mobilized, is likely to become heavily dependent upon conscience constituents.

This argument is also important in understanding the critique of interest-group pluralism as a valid description of modern America.¹⁴ Many collectivities with serious objective deprivations, and even with preexisting preferences for change, have been highly underrepresented by social movement organizations. These SMOs tend to be very limited in their control of discretionary resources. It is only when resources can be garnered from conscience adherents that viable SMOs can be fielded to shape and represent the preferences of such collectivities.

Organization Structure and Resource Mobilization

How do the competitive position of the SMS, processes within an SMI, and the structure of an SMO influence the task of resource mobilization? Some aspects of these questions have been treated by Zald and Ash (1966). To discuss SMOs in detail we need to introduce assumptions about relevant SMO processes and structures.

Assume that SMOs operate like any other organization (J. Q. Wilson, 1973), and consequently, once formed, they operate as though organizational survival were the primary goal. Only if survival is ensured can other goals be pursued. Second, assume that the costs and rewards of involvement can account for individual participation in SMOs and that, especially, selective incentives are important, since they tend to raise the rewards for involvement.¹⁵ Gamson (1975) and Bailis (1974) provide impressive evidence that selective material incentives operate to bind individuals to SMOs and, hence, serve to provide continuous involvement and thus resource mobilization.

For a number of reasons the term *member* has been avoided here. Most important, membership implies very different levels of organized involvement in different SMOs.

The distinction between inclusive and exclusive SMOs has been utilized in the past to indicate intensity of organizational involvement (Zald and Ash, 1966), but intensity of involvement actually includes several dimensions, usefully separated. Let us attempt to partition constituent involvement in any SMO. First there is the *cadre*, the individuals who are involved in the decision-making processes of the organization. Cadre members may devote most of their time to matters of the organization or only part of their time. Those who receive compensation, however meager, and devote full time to the organization, we term *professional cadre*; those who devote full time to the organization but are not involved in central decision-making processes, we term *professional staff*; those who intermittently give time to organizational tasks, not at the cadre level, we term *workers*. (Remember, constituents are those who give either time or money.)

A *transitory team* is composed of workers assembled for a specific task, short in duration. Transitory teams are typically led by cadre members. Members of transitory teams and cadre have more extensive involvement than other segments of an SMO constituency. What distinguishes these constituents from others is that they are directly linked to the organization through tasks—they are involved directly in the affairs of the SMO. Since involvement of this sort occurs in small, face-to-face groups, workers, whether through transitory teams or through continuous task involvement, can be expected to receive solidary incentives from such involvement—selective benefits of a nonmaterial sort.

Federated and Isolated Structure

An SMO that desires to pursue its goals in more than a local environment may attempt to mobilize resources directly from adherents

or to develop federated chapters in different local areas. Federation serves to organize constituents into small local units. The SMOs that develop in this manner may deal with constituents directly, as well as through chapters or only through chapters. But many SMOs do not develop chapters but deal directly with constituents, usually through the mails or through traveling field staff. The important point is that constituents in nonfederated SMOs do not normally meet in face-to-face interaction with other constituents and hence cannot be bound to the SMOs through solidary selective incentives. We term these constituents *isolated constituents*.

Federation may occur in two ways. One strategy assigns professional staff the task of developing chapters out of isolated adherents or constituents. To some extent SDS and CORE (Sale, 1973; Meier and Rudwick, 1973) utilized this approach during the 1960s. Common Cause seems to have used it recently. Another strategy relies upon preexisting nonmovement local groups that have heavy concentrations of adherents or isolated constituents (Gerlach and Hines, 1970). This latter style, termed *group mobilization* by Oberschall (1973), was typical of several waves of recruitment by the Ku Klux Klan (Lipset and Rabb, 1970). Federation developing out of preexisting groups can occur quite rapidly, whereas organizing unattached individuals probably requires more time and resources. To the extent that it utilized mass involvement in the South, the SCLC operated through preexisting groups. We have argued elsewhere (McCarthy and Zald, 1973) that nonfederated SMOs dealing with isolated constituents accounted for much of the SMS growth during the burst of SMO activity during the decade of the 1960s.

Empirically, SMOs will combine elements of the two major organizational forms we have identified here. The manner in which the organization garners the bulk of

its resources should be used to characterize it during any time period. For instance, CORE would be deemed federated until the early 1960s, nonfederated at its peak during the early 1960s, and then federated again (Meier and Rudwick, 1973). It maintained a set of federated chapters during this entire period, but during the interim period its major resource flow was provided by isolated conscience constituents.

Hypothesis 4: The more an SMO is dependent upon isolated constituents, the less stable will be the flow of resources to the SMO.

Because isolated constituents are little involved in the affairs of the SMO, support from them depends far more upon industry and organizational (and counterindustry and counterorganizational) advertising than does support from constituents who are involved on a face-to-face basis with others. Advertising and media attention provide information about the dire consequences stemming from failure to attain target goals, the extent of goal accomplishment, and the importance of the particular SMO for such accomplishment.

Strickland and Johnston's (1970) analysis of issue elasticity is useful in understanding isolated constituent involvement in SM activities. At any time a number of target goals are offered to isolated adherents to any SM by one or more SMOs (and by other SMIs). Isolated adherents may choose to become constituents by allocating resources to one or another SMO according to the goals propounded. The SMOs within any SMI will tend to compete with one another for the resources of these isolated adherents. If they allocate resources, but remain isolated, their ties to the SMO remain tenuous. To the extent that any individual is an adherent to more than one SM, various SMIs will also be competing for these resources.

Treating SMO target goals as products, then, and adherence as demand, we can apply a simple economic model to this competitive process. Demand may be elastic, and its elasticity is likely to be heavily dependent upon SMO advertising. Products may be substitutable across SMIs. For example, while various SMOs may compete for resources from isolated adherents to the "justice for black Americans" SM, SMOs representing the "justice for American women" SM may be competing for the same resources (to the extent that these two SMs have overlapping adherent pools). Some adherents may have a high and inelastic demand curve for an SMO or SMI; others' demand curves may show great elasticity.

This state of affairs suggests that effective advertising campaigns may convince isolated adherents with high-issue elasticity to switch SMOs or SMIs, or both. Issue elasticity relates to what Downs (1972) terms *issue attention cycles*. These apparent cycles, he observes, include the stages of a problem discovered, dramatic increases in adherence as advertising alerts potential adherents, attempts at problem solution, lack of success of such attempts, and a rapid decline in adherence and advertising. Isolated adherents may purchase a target goal product when offered but can be expected to base decisions about future purchases upon their conception of product quality. Tullock (1966) has argued that the consumption of such products is vicarious, not direct; thus, perceived product quality is not necessarily related to actual goal accomplishment. Much publicity is dependent upon an SMO's ability to induce the media to give free attention, because most SMOs cannot actually afford the high cost of national advertising. They do, however, use direct-mail advertising. The point is that the media mediate in large measure between isolated constituents and SMOs.

Perceived lack of success in goal accomplishment by an SMO may lead an individual to switch to SMOs with alternative strategies or, to the extent that products are substitutable, to switch to those with other target goals. It must be noted, however, that there is also an element of product loyalty in this process. Some isolated constituents may continue to purchase the product (to support an SMO) unaware of how effective or ineffective it may be.

One could treat individual SMO loyalty in the same way as political party loyalty is treated by political sociologists, but most SMOs do not command such stable loyalties from large numbers of people. Certain long-lasting SMOs, the NAACP and the AFSC, for instance, may command stable loyalties, and the process of socializing youth into SMO loyalty could be expected to be similar to that of socialization into party loyalty (Converse, 1969). This process, however, most probably occurs not among isolated constituents, but among those who are linked in more direct fashion to SMOs.

Advertising by SMOs recognizes that isolated constituents have no direct way of evaluating the product purchased; therefore, it may stress the amount of goal accomplishment available to the isolated constituent for each dollar expended. The AFSC, for instance, informs isolated potential constituents in its mass mailings that its overhead costs are among the lowest of any comparable organization, and hence the proportion of each donation used for goal accomplishment is higher; the findings of an outside consulting firm that evaluated the organization support this claim (Jonas, 1971). Within an industry SMO products are normally differentiated by conceptions of the extremity of solutions required (Killian, 1972) and by strategies of goal accomplishment (passive resistance, strikes, etc.). When products are not differentiated in

either of these ways, we can expect differentiation in terms of efficiency.

These considerations lead to a subsidiary proposition:

Hypothesis 4a: The more dependent an SMO is upon isolated constituents, the greater the share of its resources that will be allocated to advertising.

As indicated, SMO advertising can take the form of mailed material that demonstrates the good works of the organization. Media bargaining (Hubbard, 1968; Lipsky, 1968; Turner, 1969) can also be conceptualized as SMO advertising. By staging events that will possibly be "newsworthy," by attending to the needs of news organizations, and by cultivating representatives of the media, SMOs may manipulate media coverage of their activities more or less successfully.¹⁶ Some kind of information flow to isolated constituents including positive evaluation is absolutely essential for SMOs dependent upon them.

The foregoing reasoning, combined with Hypotheses 1 and 2, leads us to another related proposition:

Hypothesis 4b: The more an SMO depends upon isolated constituents to maintain a resource flow, the more its shifts in resource flow resemble the patterns of consumer expenditures and marginal goods.

Stated differently, the hypothesis holds that if an SMO is linked to its major source of constituent financial support through the advertising of its products, isolated constituents will balance out their contributions with other marginal expenditures. Time of year, state of checkbook, mood, and product arousal value will influence such decision making.

The more attractive the target goal (product) upon which such a solicitation is based, the more likely that isolated adher-

ents will become isolated constituents. Consequently, SMOs depending heavily upon such resource mobilization techniques must resort to slick packaging and convoluted appeal to self-interest in order to make their products more attractive. This should be especially true within competitive SMIs. The behavior in the early 1970s of environmental groups, which depend heavily upon isolated constituents, appears to illustrate this point. Many of those SMOs took credit for stalling the Alaskan pipeline and attempted to link that issue to personal self-interest and preferences in their direct-mail advertising. Slick packaging is evident in the high quality of printing and the heavy use of photogravure.

Another technique advertisers utilize to appeal to isolated adherents is the linking of names of important people to the organization, thereby developing and maintaining an image of credibility (Perrow, 1970a). In the same way that famous actors, sports heroes, and retired politicians endorse consumer products, other well-known personalities are called upon to endorse SMO products: Jane Fonda and Dr. Spock were to the peace movement and Robert Redford is to the environmental movement what Joe Namath is to pantyhose and William Miller is to American Express Company credit cards.

The development of local chapters helps bind constituents to SMOs through networks of friendships and interpersonal control.¹⁷ But note the following:

Hypothesis 5: An SMO that attempts to link both conscience and beneficiary constituents to the organization through federated chapter structures, and hence solidarity incentives, is likely to have high levels of tension and conflict.

Social movement analysts who have focused upon what we have termed *conscience constituency participation* normally call it outsider involvement. Von Eschen

et al. (1969), for instance, show that for a local direct action civil rights organization involvement on the part of geographical outsiders (both conscience and beneficiary) created pronounced internal conflict in the organization. Marx and Useem (1971) have examined the record of the recent civil rights movement, the abolitionist movement, and the movement to abolish untouchability in India. In these movements, "outsiders were much more prone to be active in other causes or to shift their allegiances from movement to movement" (p. 102). Ross (1975) has argued the importance of friendship ties based upon geographical and generational lines to the internal conflict of SDS. The more unlike one another workers are, the less likely there is to be organizational unity, and the more likely it is that separate clique structures will form. If conscience constituents are more likely to be active in other SMOs and to be adherents of more than one SM, we would expect their involvement to be less conscious.

Now the earlier discussion of conscience and beneficiary constituents can be combined with the analysis of SMI and SMO processes. First, conscience constituents are more likely to control larger resource pools. Individuals with more resources exhibit concerns less directly connected with their own material interests. Consequently, conscience constituents are more likely to be adherents to more than one SMO and more than one SMI.¹⁸ Though they may provide the resources for an SMO at some point, they are likely to have conflicting loyalties.

This situation provides an account for why SMO leaders have been skeptical of the involvement of conscience constituents—intellectuals in labor unions, males in the women's liberation movement, whites in the civil rights movements. Conscience constituents are fickle because they have wide-ranging concerns. They may be even more

fickle if they are isolated constituents—they are less likely to violate personal loyalties by switching priority concerns. But organizations that attempt to involve them in face-to-face efforts may have to suffer the consequences of the differences in backgrounds and outside involvements from those of beneficiary constituents. On the one hand, involving only conscience constituents in federated chapters, which might be a method of avoiding such conflict, forces the SMO to pay the price of legitimacy—how can an SMO speak for a beneficiary group when it does not have any beneficiary constituents? On the other hand, depending exclusively upon mass beneficiary constituents reduces the potential size of the resource pool that can be used for goal accomplishment.

The involvement of conscience and beneficiary constituents may lead not only to interpersonal tensions, but also to tactical dilemmas. Meier and Rudwick (1976) document the extent to which the question whether the NAACP should use black or white lawyers to fight its legal battles has been a continuous one. Especially in the early days, the symbolic value of using black lawyers conflicted sharply with the better training and courtroom effectiveness of white lawyers. W. E. B. Dubois came out on the side of courtroom effectiveness.

Rates of Resource Fluctuation and SMO Adaptation

We have focused thus far upon the development of resource flows to SMOs, primarily in terms of how they link themselves to their constituents and the size of the resource pool controlled by constituents. What are the implications of larger or smaller resource flows for the fate of SMOs, for careers in social movements, and for the use of different types of constituencies?

An interesting question concerns the staying power of new and older entries into an SMI. Consider the following proposition:

Hypothesis 6: Older, established SMOs are more likely than newer SMOs to persist throughout the cycle of SMI growth and decline.

This state of affairs is similar to the advantage of early entry for a firm in an industry: A structure in place when demand increases improves the likelihood of capturing a share of the market. Stinchcombe (1965, p. 148) points out that "as a general rule, a higher proportion of new organizations fail than old. This is particularly true of new organizational forms, so that if an alternative requires new organization, it has to be much more beneficial than the old before the flow of benefits compensates for the relative weakness of the newer social structure." All the liabilities of new organizational forms that Stinchcombe elaborates—new roles to be learned, temporary inefficiency of structuring, heavy reliance upon social relations among strangers, and the lack of stable ties to those who might use the organization's services—beset new organizations of established forms as well, if to a lesser degree.¹⁹ Moreover, a history of accomplishment is an important asset, and, as Gamson (1975) shows for his sample of SMOs, longevity provides an edge in the attainment of legitimacy. Older organizations have available higher degrees of professional sophistication, existing ties to constituents, and experience in fund-raising procedures. Thus, as factors conducive to action based upon SM preferences develop, older SMOs are more able to use advertising to reach isolated adherents, even though new SMOs may of course benefit from the experience of older ones. The NAACP, for instance, already had a fund-raising structure aimed at isolated adherents before the increase in demand for civil rights goals increased in the 1960s. And

CORE had the advantage of a professional staff member who was committed to the development of such techniques, but it took time for him to convince the decision makers of the organization to pursue such resource mobilization tactics (Meier and Rudwick, 1973). Newer SMOs may capture a share of the isolated constituent market, but they will be disadvantaged at least until they establish a clear image of themselves and a structure to capitalize upon it. J. Q. Wilson (1973) cogently argues that competition between SMOs for resources occurs between organizations offering the most similar products, not between those for which competition in goal accomplishment produces conflict. Since SMOs within the same SMI compete with one another for resources, they are led to differentiate themselves from one another. The prior existence of skilled personnel and preexisting images are advantages in this process. In the same way that name recognition is useful to political candidates it is useful to SMOs when issue campaigns occur.

Hypothesis 7: The more competitive an SMI (a function of the number and size of the existing SMOs), the more likely it is that new SMOs will offer narrow goals and strategies.

We have alluded to the process of product differentiation. As the competition within any SMI increases, the pressure to specialize intensifies. The decision of George Wiley (Martin, 1971, 1974) to present the National Welfare Rights Organization as an organization aimed at winning rights for black welfare recipients was apparently made partially as a result of the preexisting turf understanding of other civil rights organizations.

Hypothesis 8: The larger the income flow to an SMO, the more likely that cadre and staff are professional and the larger these groups are.

This proposition flows directly from an economic support model. It is obvious that the more money available to an organization, the more full-time personnel it will be able to hire. Though this is not a necessary outcome, we assume that SMOs will be confronted with the diverse problems of organizational maintenance, and as resource flows increase these will become more complex. As in any large organization, task complexity requires specialization. Specialization is especially necessary in modern America, where the legal requirements of functioning necessitate experienced technicians at a number of points in both resource mobilization and attempts to bring influence to bear. The need for skills in lobbying, accounting, and fund raising leads to professionalization.

It is not that SMOs with small resource flows do not recognize the importance of diverse organizational tasks. In them, a small professional cadre may be required to fulfill a diverse range of tasks such as liaison work with other organizations, advertising, accounting, and membership service. Large resource flows allow these functions to be treated as specialties, though organizations of moderate size may have problems of premature specialization. Economies of scale should be reached only at appropriate levels of growth. In CORE we have a good example of this process: early specialization required constant organizational reshuffling in order to combine functions and staff members in what seemed to be the most efficient manner (Meier and Rudwick, 1973).

Hypothesis 9: The larger the SMS and the larger the specific SMI, the more likely it is that SM careers will develop.

An SM career is a sequence of professional staff and cadre positions held by adherents in a number of SMOs or supportive institutions, or both. Such a career need not require continuous connection with an SMI, though the larger the SMI the more

likely such continuous involvement ought to be. Supportive institutions might be universities, church bodies, labor unions, governmental agencies, and the like (Zald and McCarthy, 1975). Moreover, target institutions sometimes develop positions for SM cadres, such as human-relations councils in local governments. Corporations have affirmative-action offices and antitrust lawyers.

When the SMI is large, the likelihood of SMI careers is greater simply because the opportunity for continuous employment is greater, regardless of the success or failure of any specific SMO. Though many of the skills developed by individuals in such careers (public relations, for instance) may be usefully applied in different SMIs, our impression is that individuals typically move between SMIs that have similar goals and hence have overlapping constituencies. Although we might find individuals moving between civil rights and labor SMOs, we would be unlikely to find movement from civil rights SMOs to fundamentalist, anticommunist ones. (But it should be remembered that communists have become anticommunists, and that an antiwar activist such as Rennie Davis later took an active role in the transcendental meditation movement.) The relevant base for SMO careers, then, is usually SMIs or interrelated SMIs.

Funding strategies affect not only careers but also the use of beneficiary constituents and workers.

Hypothesis 10: The more an SMO is funded by isolated constituents, the more likely that beneficiary constituent workers are recruited for strategic purposes rather than for organizational work.

This proposition is central to the strategy of the professional SMO. It leads to considering the mobilization of beneficiary constituent workers as a rational tool for attempts to wield influence, rather than as an

important source of organizational resources. Earlier we mentioned the creation of senior citizen groups for purposes of bargaining by the AFL-CIO in the Medicare fight. The use of some poor people for strategic purposes by the Hunger Commission, a professional SMO, also illustrates the point (Brown, 1970). Also germane is the fact that of the groups in Gamson's study (1975), none that were heavily dependent upon outside sponsors provided selective material incentives for constituents. Binding beneficiary constituents to an SMO with incentives is not so important to an organization that does not need them in order to maintain a resource flow.

Much of this discussion has been framed in terms of discretionary money, but discretionary time is also of importance.

Hypothesis 11: The more an SMO is made up of workers with discretionary time at their disposal, the more readily it can develop transitory teams.

The ability to concentrate large numbers of constituents and adherents is highly useful for SMOs in certain situations, such as demonstrations. But the occupational characteristics of constituents and adherents are crucial to an understanding of how an SMO or a coalition of SMOs is able to produce such concentrations. Producing large numbers can be used to impress bystanders, authorities, and opponents. In some nations (particularly authoritarian ones) authorities may, through control over employers or control of the work schedules of governmental employees, be able to produce large concentrations at will. But SMOs typically do not exercise such control; hence, it is the preexisting control adherents and constituents exercise over their own work schedules that shapes the possibility of concentration. The same mechanisms operate in peasant societies where the possibilities of concerted action are shaped by planting and harvesting schedules.

In modern society discretion over work schedules tends to be related to larger pools of discretionary income, allowing travel to distant sites as well. The discretion of constituents over work schedules, then, may be seen as a potential organizational resource useful in mounting short bursts of organizational activity. Students, college professors, and other professionals, for instance, probably find a three-day trip to Washington for a demonstration easier to bear than wage workers do. The March on Washington in support of the war in Vietnam, headed by the Rev. Carl McIntire, was poorly attended. For the reasons enumerated above, many of the adherents to which he appeals were probably unable to attend such a demonstration.²⁰

Conclusion

The resource mobilization model we have described here emphasizes the interaction between resource availability, the preexisting organization of preference structures, and entrepreneurial attempts to meet preference demand. We have emphasized how these processes seem to operate in the modern American context. Different historical circumstances and patterns of preexisting infrastructures of adherence will affect the strategies of SMO entrepreneurial activity in other times and places. Our emphasis, however, seems to be useful in accounting for parallel activity in different historical contexts, including peasant societies, and in explaining the processes of growth and decline in withdrawal movements as well.

The history of the Bolshevik SMO (Wolfe, 1955) shows how important stable resource flows are to the competitive position of an SMO. The Bolsheviks captured the resource flow to the Russian Social Revolutionary movement and, at certain points in their history, depended heavily upon isolated conscience constituents. Free media are prob-

ably necessary to mass isolated constituent involvement in resource flows, so isolated adherents with control over large resource pools are probably more important to SMI growth in societies without mass media. Leites and Wolf (1970) make a similar analysis of the revolutionary SMI in its relationship to the constant rewards of participation by the peasants in Vietnam. Of course, the extent of discretionary resources varies considerably between that case and the modern American case, but so did the ability of authorities to intervene in the manipulation of costs and rewards of individual involvement in the revolutionary SMO. The flow of resources from outside South Vietnam was important in the SMO's ability to manipulate these costs and rewards. Extranational involvement in the American SMS seems almost nonexistent.

Moreover, Oberschall (1973) has shown how important communal associations may be for facilitating mobilization in tribal and peasant societies. Although the number of SMOs and hence the size of the SMI may be smaller in peasant societies, resource mobilization and SM facilitation by societal infrastructure issues are just as important.

Withdrawal movements are typically characterized primarily by the way in which constituents are bound to the SMO (Kanter, 1972). But SMOs in withdrawal SMs also encounter difficulties in developing stable resource flows, and they use a variety of strategies similar to those of other SMOs in response to their difficulties. The recent behavior of the Unification Church of America (led by the Reverend Sun Myung Moon) in the United States illustrates processes close to those we have focused upon for modern reform movements: heavy use of advertising and emphasis upon stable resource flows in order to augment the development of federated constituencies. The Father Divine Peace Mission (Cantril, 1941) utilized rather different strategies of

resource mobilization, including a heavier dependence upon the constituents themselves, but the importance of maintaining flows for continued viability was recognized in both of these withdrawal movements.

Our attempt has been to develop a partial theory; we have only alluded to, or treated as constant, important variables: the interaction of authorities, SMOs, and bystander publics; the dynamics of media involvement; the relationship between SMO workers and authorities; the impact of industry structure; the dilemmas of tactics. Yet, in spite of the limitations of this brief statement of the resource mobilization perspective, it offers important new insights into the understanding of social movement phenomena and can be applied more generally.

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NOTES

1. One reflection of this change has been discussion of the appropriateness of including the study of social movements within the social psychology section of the American Sociological Association (see the *Critical Mass Bulletin*, 1973-74). The issue is whether social movements research should consist largely of individual social psychological analysis (e.g., value, attitudes, and grievances of participants).
2. We are responding here to the dominant focus. Some analysts, most notably Rudolf Heberle (1951, 1968) among U.S.-based sociologists, have viewed social movements from a distinctly structural perspective. Of course, structural approaches have remained dominant in Europe.

3. For example, see Levy (1970). For an early attempt to move beyond a simple grievance model, see Morrison (1971): this article attempts to explain recruitment in social movement organizations rather than the attitudes of movement support of isolated individuals. Gurr's own empirical studies have led him to emphasize institutional-structural factors more heavily, because he has found that the structural characteristics of dissident groups are important factors in accounting for both violent and nonviolent civil strife (Gurr, 1972).
4. For a full and balanced review of research and theory about social movements during the past decade, see Marx and Wood (1975).
5. Other contributors to the research mobilization perspective, aside from those already noted, are James Q. Wilson (1973), Breton and Breton (1969), Leites and Wolf (1970), Etzioni (1968), Jenkins and Perrow (1977), Salisbury (1969), Strickland and Johnston (1970), and Tullock (1966).
6. There is by no means a clear consensus on the definition of the crucial term *social movement*. We employ an inclusive definition for two reasons. First, by doing so, we link our work to as much past work as possible. Second, there are important theoretical reasons that will be discussed below. Our definition of *social movement* allows the possibility that a social movement will not be represented by any organized groups but also allows for organizations that do not represent social movements at formation. Most earlier definitions have included both preferences and organizational factors. See Wilkinson (1971) for an extensive survey of definitions of *social movement*.
7. Making the distinction between a social movement (SM) and a social movement organization (SMO) raises the question of the relevance of the vast literature developed by political scientists on the subject of interest groups. Is an SMO an interest group? Interest group theorists often blur the distinction between the representative organization and the interest group (e.g., the AMA and doctors) (see Wootton [1970] for an extended discussion). Whereas political scientists usually focus upon interest groups' organizations and not the groups themselves, sociologists largely have focused upon social movements rather than upon social movement organizations. Though we are not fully satisfied with Lowi's (1971) distinction between the two terms, we will employ it for a lack of a better one. Lowi maintains that an SMO that becomes highly institutionalized and routinizes stable ties with a governmental agency is an interest group. This way of approaching the problem, of course, flows from Lowi's distinctive view of the functioning of pluralistic politics.
8. Although we can easily label the SMs these organizations relate to—political reform and peace, for instance—the diffuseness of their goals and the range of their concern seem to bring them closer to representing what Blumer (1946) calls *general movements*. Blumer's notion of general movements (as contrasted with specific ones) implies widespread appeal and attendant trends in culture and lifestyle, however, and the general peace-humanitarian organizations do not appear to generate such appeal today. In any case, Blumer's distinction is an early attempt to distinguish movements along dimensions of specificity of goals. (See Halloran's [1971] treatment of Common Cause, Jonas's [1971] treatment of the AFSC, and Hentoff's [1963] treatment of FOR for analyses of the wide range of goals pursued by these SMOs.)
9. Of course, the size of the resource pool controlled by an individual or an organization that might be allocated to an SMO is a dimension. We dichotomize the dimension only for purposes of discussion, and the appropriate cutting point will vary from situation to situation.
10. A potential beneficiary group has normally been termed an interest group. The distinction between beneficiaries and adherents recognizes that interests and preferences may not coincide.
11. We have borrowed this term from Harrington (1968, p. 291), who uses it to refer to middle-class liberals who have demonstrated strong sympathies for the interests of underdog groups. Our use broadens the meaning of the term.
12. The recent resource mobilization difficulties of the consumer movement as prosperity wanes provide support for these arguments. (See Morris [1975] for extensive evidence of the fund-raising difficulties of consumer groups—especially professional SMOs—and

- the resulting organizational difficulties, and Pombeiro [1975] and the *New York Times* [1974] for similar material on a wide range of SMOs.)
13. Stouffer (1955) showed that among Americans the wealthier experienced fewest personal worries, though they were more concerned than the poorer with the problems beyond their immediate experience. In the United States wealth is positively related to happiness in general (Bradburn and Caplovitz, 1964). Cantril (1965) used a ladder technique to have respondents place themselves with respect to their closeness to "the best possible life." He shows that upper economic groups in a number of nations place their present circumstances closest to full satisfaction. Important for our analysis, when asked a similar question about their satisfaction with the nation, American respondents who were wealthy were no more satisfied than their counterparts.
 14. For a review and statement of the critique, see Connolly (1969).
 15. See Clark and Wilson (1961), J. Q. Wilson (1973), and Zald and Jacobs (1976), for a discussion of various types of incentives.
 16. See *Organizer's Manual Collective* (1971) for a review of media manipulation techniques. The many "how to do it" books vary in their sophistication and comprehensiveness. Several others worthy of note are Kahn (1970), Walzer (1971), and Ross (1973).
 17. Orum and Wilson (1975), and Freeman (1975) discuss the role of preexisting solidarity relations in SMO mobilization.
 18. The empirical pattern of such ideological overlapping in choices of SMO and SMI provides a very different way of distinguishing SMIs from the one we have chosen. Ideological coherence is unusual, of course. See Campbell et al. (1960) for an empirical treatment of this problem, and Miller and Levitin (1976) for a more recent demonstration with regard to what has been termed the "new left" ideology. Even though conscience constituent involvement in an SMO or SMI may not imply involvement in another SMO or SMI through preexisting ideological coherence, any involvement increases the likelihood of adherence to another SM.
 19. Stinchcombe's (1965) attempt to isolate the factors related to the rate of organizational formation in a society is quite similar to our own. He maintains that (1) new ways of doing things (technologies), (2) the belief on the part of organizational entrepreneurs that new organizations will have staying power, (3) a belief in direct benefits flowing from new technologies, (4) resource availability, and (5) the belief that opponents will not defeat organizing attempts are important factors in understanding the rate of organizational formation. Our analysis has stressed the first and fourth factors, but our formulation recognizes the importance of the other factors.
 20. See Cicchetti et al. (1971) for an empirical demonstration of the costs of attendance and their effects upon recruitment patterns in an antiwar demonstration. For a study showing the minor importance of ideological commitment relative to structural and preorganizational factors for the McIntire-organized march, see Lin (1974-75).

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12

THE POLITICAL PROCESS MODEL

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The political process model represents an alternative to the classical and resource mobilization perspectives. The term "political process" has been taken from an article by Rule and Tilly entitled "Political Process in Revolutionary France,

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1830-1832" (1975: 41-85).¹ It should, however, be emphasized that the model advanced by Rule and Tilly is compatible but not synonymous with the perspective outlined here. The name has been adopted, not because the two models are identical, but because the term "political process" accurately conveys two ideas central to both perspectives. First, in contrast to the various classical formulations, a social movement is held to be above all else a *political* rather than a psychological phenomenon. That is, the