We saw that sequential pairwise voting does not satisfy Pareto. Does it satisfy unanimity

 We saw that sequential pairwise voting does not satisfy Pareto. Does it satisfy unanimity

1. [From the textbook] We say that a social choice system satisfies the criterion of unanimity if an alternative is the unique social choice whenever every ballot has that alternative ranked highest. Prove that if a social choice procedure satisfies Pareto, then it must also satisfy unanimity. (Page 43)

2. [From the textbook] We saw that sequential pairwise voting does not satisfy Pareto. Does it satisfy unanimity? Explain. (page 44)

3. [From the textbook] A board of directors for a small corporation consists of three members: Derek with 5 votes as the largest shareholder, Christina with 4 votes as the next largest shareholder, and Isabelle with 3 votes as the smallest shareholder. The quota for passage of any issue is 7 votes. Prove that although each of the three directors has a different number of votes, each has equal power in the sense that no one voter can single-handedly pass a motion and any two voter scan pass any motion. (page 66)

Mathematics and Politics Strategy, Voting, Power and Proof by Alan D. Taylor, Allison M. Pacelli (auth.) (z-lib.org)

Answer preview to we saw that sequential pairwise voting does not satisfy Pareto. Does it satisfy unanimity

 We saw that sequential pairwise voting does not satisfy Pareto. Does it satisfy unanimity

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