Week 3 – READ – Kluners

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*Freud as a Philosopher of History^*

“philosophie de l'histoire," "philosophy of history" is the name Voltaire,in 1765^ gave to a project, which dominated European—especiallyGerman philosophy for the following three generations and was importantuntil the Fall of Communism at the end of the 20th century. Thisideology for decades functioned as a substitute for religion for a quarterof the world's population and also influenced the work of, probably themost influential philosopher of history, Karl Marx. Despite the greatdiversity of the many different approaches in a period of more than twohundred years, there are five main themes that theories of philosophersof history from different times treat again and again:

(1) Voltaire himself advised what philosophically enlightened *historiansshould do with history:* "In all nations," he wrote, history was "distorted byfables, until finally philosophy enlightened Man."^ Historians shouldtherefore untangle the deformed history by using their critical intellect.A hundred years later the protagonists of German historism, Droysen andDilthey, created the perhaps most important theories of historians'duties: Droysen interpreted Man as a being with two qualities—an actingsubject on the one hand, and a subject of historical cognition on theother. Man can understand the reasons why people do or do not do certainthings. So for Droysen the duty of the historian is the reconstruction ofthe intention of human action\*. Dilthey advanced Droysen's theory andcalled his science of "[t]he rule-guided understanding of permanentlyfixed manifestations of life," of "exegesis or interpretation," *hermeneutics:^*Historians should, among other things, reproduce coherences ofmemory.'^ Still at the end of the 20th century—after the so-called linguisticturn—thinkers continue to formulate imperatives for the historian'swork from a narrative point of view. Paul Ricoeur wrote an analysis ofThe Journal of Psychohistory 42 (1) Summer 201456 *Martin KlünersTime and Narrative^* in three volumes that Hayden White called "the mostimportant synthesis of literary and historical theory produced" in the20th century.^

(2) Voltaire's main aim—as of most philosophers of history in the 18thcentury—was to show how Man was not the object of God's disposal, butmade history himself, that he could understand the sense of history byhis intellectual potency and that there had been a *continuous progress inthe unfolding of intellectual capacities, of "reason" or "enlightenment."* Thispattern returns, in different forms, in the main works of the philosophyof history, from Voltaire to Condorcet, Schelling and Hegel. Even Weber'sanalysis of rationalisation is a kind of sociological philosophy of historythat examines the progress of enlightenment in occidental history. In itsnegation the pattern of growing enlightenment leads to the pessimistic*Dialectic of enlightenment^* of Horkheimer and Adorno. One could call itthe main pattern, the centre of occidental philosophy of history; it isidentical with the optimism of the age of enlightenment and, after havingprovoked its own negation in failed and bloody revolutions, with the

delusion of this optimism (see also 5).

(3) For some of the thinkers the ascent of enlightenment did not take placein a simple and linear development, but in a *dialectic* process. Fichte andespecially Hegel created virtuoso dialectic systems, which influenced Marx.

(4) According to Arnold Gehlen it was also Fichte who invented the motifof *Entfremdung, alienation,* by defining liberty as regaining control over lostproducts of one's own acting. i° Especially for Karl Marx *Entfremdung* becameone of the most important concepts of his materialistic theory, as history for

him was the history of growing alienation, caused by the contradictionbetween the means of production and the relations of production.

(5) After revolutions had ended in terror or failure, the ideas of theenlightenment, especially that Man made his own history, lost more andmore their persuasive power. Later, Schelling even began to doubt themight of historical reason, which he had himself celebrated in hisyouth.i^ In the 19th century the conviction prevailed that human reasonwas unconscious and that one could not predict the aftermath of humanacts—history had shown that human acts often resulted in effects totallydifferent from those predicted or projected. This theme—in Germanoften described as *"Kontingenz" (contingency)^^*—is the reason why philosophy of history, which had been the paradigmatic philosophical disciplinefrom the middle of the 18th to the 19th century, generally forfeitedits importance and began to be criticized.—even leading, in some cases,to the complete refusal not only of the idea of growing enlightenment,

but of any attempt to understand the sense of history. This was true especiallyafter the experience of the two world wars, genocide, and totalitarianismin the 20th century. 'Philosophy of history in the late 20th century seemed to exist only inwhat German philosopher Odo Marquard (Ijorn 1928) called"Schwundstufen"^^—shrinkage levels.

Despite this crisis of philosophy of history and the many critiques thatoccurred since the 19th century, a renaissance of this concept can beobserved in an increasingly globalized world, which seeks new kinds significance.Great works of universal history like those of Weber, Toynbeeand others that do *not* share the classical motifs of philosophy of history,like increasing enlightenment and liberty,^"\* have shown what a serious,scientific philosophy of history based on empirically gained data mightlook like. Apart from this, there has been an epistemological debate onformal aspects and, as a result, a slight rehabilitation of philosophy ofhistory since Arthur C. Danto demonstrated the explaining functions of

narrating sentences in his *Analytical philosophy ofhistory.^^*So many of the questions posed by philosophers of history are still relevanttoday. In particular, the unintentional consequences of human actsare a scientific problem that does not lose its fascination or its interest.I would like to show why another *Schwundstufe* of philosophy of history—psychoanalysis^^—has the best answers to nearly all of these questions:Psychoanalysis itself is, in the words of the German historianHans-Ulrich Wehler, a "historical science" as it uses the individual historyof the patient as a basis for its diagnoses and therapy, i'' There are someconnecting lines between philosophy, philosophers of history, and thescience Freud founded.^^

**HISTORIANS' DUTIES . ,**

When Voltaire describes history—or better the image of history up to histime—as a biased, warped thing (and one would like to add: biased andwarped by *memory),"^^* the solution he postulates for this problem manifestsanalogies to the psychoanalytic notion of working-through. The historian

is, in psychoanalytic terms, a kind of representative of the secondaryprocess. Voltaire can be seen here as a precursor of Paul Ricoeurwho in his connection of literary and historical theory compares the com

*Martin Klüners*position of the plot to tbe psychoanalytic situation. Ricoeur calls tbe compositionof tbe plot "mimesis" and divides it into préfiguration, configurationand refiguration, or mimesis I, II and 111.^° Préfiguration or mimesisI is identical witb tbe reader's ability to recognize acting by its structural

cbaracteristics; it is pre-narrative. Tbe configuration (mimesis II) mediatesbetween mimesis I and III, between tbe prior understanding and tbe finalunderstanding of refiguration in wbicb tbe reader compares tbe read storywitb bis own life story. Ricoeur defines tbe bistory of tbe individual's life as

based on untold stories; in order to get its narrative identity, tbese untold,repressed stories bave to be told, using tbe fragments passed down bymemory—similar to what Diltbey, one bundred years before, called tbereproduction of coberences of memory. Tbis working-tbrougb can be usednot only for tbe reconstruction of tbe individual's story, but also for tbatof groups and society.^^ Tbere is a fundamental affinity between tbe workof tbe bistorian and tbat of tbe psycboanalyst.Nietzscbe, in contrast, saw tbe necessity of a "critical" bistory wbicbshould bave tbe force to "break" and to clear away tbe past to make lifepossible.^^ To tbe suffering individual liberation from bistory could be,according to Nietzscbe, a boon. One could be curious about bow Nietzscbewould bave argued if be bad gotten to know Freud's theory andtberapy. He migbt bave realized and even appreciated tbat liberationfrom bistory—is something tbat simply is not possible. A better understandingand, in tbe best case, a reconciliation witb bistory is tbe aim ofpsycboanalytic working-tbrougb. Not liberation from bistory, but liberationfrom tbe distortion of bistory, can cure tbe sufferer. Tbe liberationNietzscbe postulated is more like wbat psychoanalysis calls repressionand in fact is tbe opposite of a successful bealing.

Anotber boundary line between bistorical tbeory and psychoanalysisis related to wbat Droysen considered tbe bistorian's main duty: Tbereconstruction of tbe intention of buman action is a kind of *psychology.*But Droysen limits bimself to *conscious* intention, and can give no realanswer to tbe question of wby buman acts so often bave otber consequencestban tbose consciously intended. Psycboanalysis is tbe "better"bistorism as it takes account of tbe unconscious.^^ Tbe integration of tbe

unconscious also allows us to examine tbe meaning of tbe wisb in bistory—botb tbe wisb of tbe acting individuals or groups wbo *"make"* bistory,as well as **tbe** wisb of tbose wbo *write* bistory: One of tbe greatestproblems of pbilosopbical bistoriograpby is tbe dialectic of (unrealistic)wisb and resulting delusion. Tbe examination of wbat pbilosopbers ofbistory wanted to see in bistory and *why* tbey wanted to see it would be anilluminating project and might be the basis for the historian's or historiographer's

own self-reflection.^\*

**RATIONALISATION**

Two philosophers writing at the end of the 18th century provide examples

of the idea of the *continuous progress of human reason:* Condorcet,

ignoring the contemporary violent and inhuman aspects of the French

revolution that will later kill him, is the author of a *Sketch for a Historical*

*Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind* in which he argues for the necessity

of the progress of reason. In its untroubled optimism Condorcet's

work is considered the classical example of the idea of progress in the age

of enlightenment.^^ In Germany, the young Schelling writes at nearly the

same time a chronology of the self-fulfilment of reason. In his account

the first stage in human history was the direct and unadulterated condition

of sense perception—paradise; the second was that of the fall of

mankind, in which logos destroyed the unity of life in the sense perception;

and in the third stage efforts to undo the fall of mankind and the

redemption of the world by the aid of reason lead to a new paradise on a

higher level. Human history therefore is a "history of liberating human

reason from the limits of sense perception to the existence of the unity of

reason."2Ö This is very similar to what Freud nearly 150 years later calls

*The Progress in Spirituality* in his analysis of *Moses and Monotheism:* One of

the, according to Freud, most important "precepts of Mosaic religion,"

"the prohibition against making an image of God," signified subordinating

sense perception to an abstract idea; it was a triumph of spirituality over

the senses; more precisely an instinctual renunciation accompanied by

its psychologically necessary consequences.^^ Progress in spirituality from

the psychoanalytic point of view is instinctual renunciation and its origins

are assigned to a certain historic period, the development of Mosaic

monotheism, which is not far from Max Weber's definition of the origins

of occidental rationalisation: The "disenchantment of the world" which

began, according to Weber, with both Hellenistic scientific thought and

ancient Jewish prophecy and led finally to the inner worldly asceticism

of Protestantism. Inner worldly asceticism itself can be seen as a sort of

sublimation and would therefore also be related to the various modalities

of instinctual renunciation.^^

The self-fulfilment of reason as described by Schelling is an idea that

became very important in the philosophy of another exponent of German

idealism whose work is regarded as the climax of philosophy of history.

Hegel interprets world history as the history of reason; reason rules

the world.^^ But "reason" for Hegel does not necessarily mean consciousness.

Reason in fact uses human passions for its self-fulfllment: "This

maybe called the *cunning of reason*—that it sets the passions to work for

itself, while that which develops its existence through such impulsion

pays the penalty, and suffers loss. "3° The optimistic view of a cunning of

reason, a heritage of the age of enlightenment, may alienate today's readers

of Hegel's philosophy as well as all of the optimistic theories of the

18th and early 19th centuries, but the supposition that there has been a

historic increase of knowledge and an increase in rationality is still considered

to be common sense in the present time.

I would like to connect the idea of increasing rationality or *consciousness*

with that of the cultural or historic *ego,* a term that already appears

in Schelling's writings.^' Increasing consciousness was an expression of

an extension of the ego.-'^ The historic ego tends to its own extension,

but the ego is not always in control of this process—it not only sets the

passions to work for itself, but also is set by *the passions* to work for *them.*

The idea that the ego and the passions are *antagonists* that often *fight*

against each other allows us to see the ambivalence of rationality or

enlightenment—which was a favourite theme of many 20th century

thinkers, as formulated by Horkheimer and Adorno in the *Dialectic of*

*Enlightenment.* They reversed Hegel's optimistic teleology of the self-fulfilment

of reason and wrote a negative teleology of reason, a history of the

decline of enlightenment from emancipation to governance. But as a

negative teleology is not less tendentious than a positive one, there has

to be a more realistic and less ideological solution to explain the ambivalence

of emancipation: emancipation is fundamentally *Oedipal.* Oedipus

aspires to emancipation from parental, or, in the patriarchal society,

fatherly dominance. This struggle for independence however is not

always successful as patriarchal dominance includes the introjection of

dominance structures into the son's psyche. So fatherly dominance in

fact does not get abolished, but substituted for by another dominance,

the dominance of the son. If the history of the emancipatory process can

be interpreted as an Oedipal individuation, the ambivalence of this

dynamic psychological process is the cause for the ambivalence of

enlightenment. This ambivalence results from the relationship of father

and son—the father has the function of a role model for the son, but in

truth is seen also as an enemy to fight against. These hostile feelings of

the son against the father evoke a deep sense of guilt that has to be rationalised.

So "rationalisation" is not only a term for the rational attainment

of an aim and the increasing assertion of this principle in history,but also has an important psychopathological aspect as the psychoanalytic

use of this term already suggests: Introduced in 1908 by Ernest Jones

into the psychoanalytic vocabulary, rationalisation describes the ambition

to find coherent, "rational" reasons for non-identified real motives

of acting, sentiments, thoughts etc. which is supported by ideologies,

morality, religion, or political convictions—what Weber called ideas—as

the activity of the superego reinforces the ego's mechanisms of defence.^^

The assumption that ideologies, morality, religion, and political convictions

could influence thinking would offer the possibility of using psychoanalysis

to help understand historically powerful ideas and to finally

find an answer to the question of why history so often yields other developments

than those consciously intended.

DIALECTIC *•-* fi

For the thinkers of German idealism rationalisation was a dialectic

process. I would like to focus on the parallels between Hegel's and Freud's

dialectic as Paul Ricoeur analysed them in his *Essay on Interpretation.-^^*

Ricoeur seeks "to find in Freud an inverted image of Hegel"^^ by comparing

their respective dialectics: Freud links, in the words of Ricoeur, "a thematized

archaeology of the unconscious to an unthematized teleology of the

process of becoming conscious," while "Hegel links an explicit teleology

of mind or spirit to an implicit archaeology of life and desire. "^'' Hegel

does not develop a phenomenology of the consciousness, but of *spirit,* so

spirit is more than consciousness. Between "the Hegelian dialectic of *reduplicated*

consciousness" and "the process of consciousness that develops in

the analytic relation there is a remarkable structural homology," "[t]he

entire analytic relation can be reinterpreted as a dialectic of consciousness,

rising from life to self-consciousness, from the satisfaction of desire to the

recognition of the other consciousness."^^ According to Ricoeur, the relation

between the analyst and the patient is similar to, the Hegelian relation

between master and slave. The Hegelian terms of "satisfaction" and

"recognition" are of such great importance for psychoanalysis that "we

can say that all the dramas psychoanalysis discovers are located on the

path that leads from 'satisfaction' to 'recognition.'"^^ Freud's thought is,

like that of Hegel, fundamentally dialectical, especially in the second

topography: "The second topography is the dialectic properly so-called in

and through which arise the various instinctual dichotomies and the

opposed pairs of instinctual vicissitudes [...]. The question of the superego

lies at the origin of the dialectical situation [...]. Furthermore, the series of

pairs, ego-id, ego-superego, ego-world, which constitute these dependentrelations, are all presented, as in the Hegelian dialectic, as master-slaverelationships that must be overcome."^' For Freud world history, the relafionshipof human nature, cultural development and religion—are seen as

the mirroring of the dynamic conflicts between ego, id and superego\*"—

this dialectic is the base of a potential synthesis of Hegelian philosophy of

history and psychoanalytic cultural theory.

**ALIENATION**

Karl Marx upended the Hegelian idealistic dialectic and interpreted the

idea mentioned above, tracing it originally back to Fichte, that alienation

is losing control over the products of one's own acting, in a materialist

way: *Labour* is not only the quality that distinguishes man from animal, it is

also the reason for the transformation of human nature and for human

*Entfremdung (alienation),* the central term of Marxist theory. The dual character

of labour—as it involves the human relationship to nature as well as

being a social phenomenon—causes the alienation not only of the individual,

but also of his social situation. History is the story of increasing alienation

and will end in the self-destruction of capitalism. Control over history

will finally be regained by means of the revolution of the proletariat.\*^

There have been many attempts to link Marxism with psychoanalysis

such as those of the Critical Theory or Existentialism,\*^ as well as Reich,

Fromm, and much of what came to be called the Freudian Left, It is probably

the idea of alienation and the offer of solutions to undo it that

makes psychoanalysis so attractive for Marxist thinkers. Also, Freud was

very sceptical about Marxist theory, especially its method of explaining

alienation only by materialistic criteria and the reduction of human history

to a socio-economic process.\*^ Especially in *Über eine Weltanschauung^*

Freud criticizes the complete absence of psychological arguments in

Marxist theory, the similarity of Marxism and religion as producers of

illusions, the intolerance of the "practical Marxism"—Bolshevism—

toward critics, which reminds Freud of the former intolerance of the

Church etc.... Freud compares the expectance of a future paradise on

earth to Jewish messianism—more than a decade before Löwith does the

same in *Meaning in History.\*^* Furthermore, for Freud the transformation

of human nature within a few generations as intended by Marxism is

deeply unrealistic.

If one follows the German historian Heinz Dieter Kittsteiner who argued

that Marx's term *Naturwüchsigkeit* is a synonym for the unconscious and

communism nothing else than the abolishment of the unconscious history,\*^

psychoanalysis for Marxist thinkers would have the funcfion of supplementing

a political-economic theory psychologically, of a *psychological*

method to abolish tbe unconscious. But at tbe same time tbe differences

between Marxist and psycboanalytic tbeory become clearer: Psycboanalysis

does not aim to "abolisb" tbe unconscious, but only to transform alienated

parts of tbe ego, to get tbem back from tbe id. Tbe psycboanalytic definition

and interpretation of consciousness is mucb more complex tban

tbe pbilosopbical one. For Psycboanalysis consciousness is influenced by

many factors otber tban tbe material or social being.^^

Tbere migbt be an at least indirect parallel in tbeir respective notions of

alienation. Freud, in a letter to Romain Rolland in 1936,'\*^ says tbat alienation

exists in two forms: either a part of reality seems to be alien or a

part of tbe ego does. Alienation is a special kind of defence tbat wants to

deny tbe existence of elements from tbe outside world or from tbe inner

world. In tbe concrete case tbat be tries to explain to bis friend Rolland, a

guilt feeling causes a disturbance of memory on tbe Acropolis. Tbis guilt

feeling is evoked by tbe encounter witb tbe spbere of Greek antiquity—

wbicb for Freud is a symbol of baving surpassed tbe fatber by baving, in

contrast to bim, learned Greek at scbool and bad a bigber, bumanistic

education. Surpassing tbe fatber tbougb is analogous to violating an

interdiction. Interpreted psycboanalytically, also bistoric alienation could

result from tbe sense of guilt of tbe son wbo surpasses tbe fatber, wbicb

occurs in tbe course of tbe progress of civilization.

**CONTINGENCY**

After tbe questions concerning tbe bistorians' duties, tbe process of rationalisation,

tbe dialectic and tbe alienation in bistory, tbe last, and in **tbe**

present time perbaps, tbe most important problem of pbilosopby of bistory

regards tbe unintended consequences of buman action. Yet Droysen

suggested tbat bistorical facts are not based on tbe conscious acts of volition

of few individuals, but on tbe interaction of many, tbat tbey are tbe

result of a *correlation* of action.\*^ In Droysen's time anotber concept

became more and more important and was popular already before tbe

rise of tbe psycboanalysis: Scbelling bad introduced tbe unconscious into

tbe pbilosopbical discourse (altbougb Leibniz bad bad similar ideas bundred

years earlier), but especially Eduard von Hartmann's book *The Philosophy*

*of the Unconscious* (1869) was very important in tbe second balf of

tbe 19tb century^o Freud claimed later tbat only bypnotism—wbicb be

considered a forerunner of psycboanalysis—bad made tbe unconscious

an object of scientific experiment.^^ However, tbe unconscious finally

found its way not only into psycbology, but also into tbe theories of bistorians.

Ernst Troeltscb describes, as tbe major problem of bistorical

researcb, tbe tension between tbe common and tbe particular, betweensociety and individuals, between objective and subjective spirit.^^ Toresolve this problem he proposes the unconscious as a "fundamental"

term of history.^^ His definition of the unconscious is close to that of psychology;

Troeltsch though does not refer to Freud or other depth psychologists.

He even suggests categories equivalent to what psychoanalysis

calls "preconscious."^'\* Both the unconscious and the preconscious

operate not only in the individual, but also in society. Troeltsch anticipates

to a certain extent the considerations about the supra-individual

unconscious of psychoanalysts like Erich Fromm and Mario Erdheim.^^

Fromm supposed a "filter"—consisting of language, logic, and morals—

decides which experiences are allowed to become conscious and which

have to remain unconscious. The whole cultural apparatus serves to

uphold the supra-individual unconsciousness.^^ A change in the status

quo makes it possible for unconscious experiences to come to consciousness

because they lose their dangerousness.^'' Mario Erdheim defines the

supra-individual unconscious as the attributes of a society that do not get

reflected in a sufficient way and therefore cause unexpected developments.

At the same time they are responsible for cultural change. The

central problem of philosophy of history is the lack of regard for unconscious

factors in history.^^ Also deeply influenced by psychoanalytic

thought, the sociological theory of Norbert Elias tries to resolve the problem

of contingency by examining the process of human interaction: the

analysis of "figurations"—networks of interdependent humans—allow us

to reconstruct the structures of human action which seems at first undesigned,

but in reality are the result of interdependent individual acts. The

larger the figuration, the more intensive is the control of the affects, the

might of the superego.^^ Due to figurational sociology the traditional

confrontation of "individual" and "society" as antagonists loses its

importance and seems more and more to be an artificial construct. Elias

does not only give an answer to the question of why human acts often

have unintended consequences, he also demonstrates how Freudian

topography, the theory of superego, ego and id, and sociological theory

can be synthesized. With this approach there might also be a way to

understand the mechanisms by which historic ideas have an effect on

individuals and society. Weber's sociology of religion was in fact a reformulated

philosophy of history, an examination of the influence of the

spirit and the ideas and their indirect, unconscious consequences.

**CONCLUSION**

After describing what I consider the five main aspects of philosophy ofhistory and their connections with psychoanalysis, I would like to bringfour of them—rationalisation, dialectic, alienation and contingency—together in a short hypothetical reconstruction of their supposed originalcoherence, as in my opinion they are all different parts of one greatsocio-psychological problem. ;For a long time, alienation was the object of philosophic speculationthat did not allow secure assertions because of our lack of knowledgeabout prehistoric societies. But cultural anthropology has made greatprogress since the 19th century, and what we know today about humanprehistory enables us to evaluate philosophic terms by comparing theirmeaning to certain pre- and protohistoric phenomena. For 99% of hishistory Man lived as hunter and gatherer with very few cultural changes.The "big bang" of cultural development, took place in what is calledNeolithisation today: sedentariness, farming, use of domesticated animals,new forms of labour, the growth of human societies and theincreasing number of wars''° had deep impacts on Man's relation tonature, with great psychological consequences.\*'^ We have to imagine thealienation starting here as a *psychic* alienation, particularly because of theincrease of violent conflicts and aggressiveness in Neolithic societies.Guilt is also a special form of aggression—an aggression directed not tothe exterior, but to the psychic interior.^^ j would like to suggest that the

increase in external aggression—as in wars, but also under growing pressurefrom family conflicts—leads to an increase in internal aggression aswell, an increase in guilt. The ego becomes weakened by the id and laterby the superego, a development caused by transgenerational transmissionof traumatic experiences. The ego tends, as mentioned above, to itsown extension—enlightenment, rationalisation, progress in spiritualitycan all be seen as expressions of the ego-extension. According to culturalanthropologist Marvin Harris, the increase in violent conflicts can lead toanother relationship of fathers and sons. Harris believes that the sexuallydetermined hostility between fathers and sons—the Oedipus complex—is not the origin, but the result of the increase in violent conflicts and innew ideals of virility in more and more militant societies.^^ However, theintensiflcation of Oedipal conflicts probably has strengthened the will ofthe sons to liberate themselves from their fathers' suppression, the will ofemancipation. But as they had internalised dominance structures themselves,their emancipation had to remain a very ambivalent thing. Theinterior as well as the exterior conflicts were master-slave relationships.Freud was right to regard the dynamic conflicts of ego, superego and id asthe foundation of human history. The advantage of psychoanalytic "philosophyof history" over the traditional philosophy of history is based onthe fact that it takes into consideration the unconscious aspects of

66 v;: *Martin Ktüners*human acting—Psychoanalytic theory makes possible a more realistic

image of Man and his history as both social and a natural being.

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ENDNOTES

1. This article gives an outline of the main results of my PhD thesis that has been

published in 2013 (Klüners, Martin. 2013. *Geschichtsphilosophie und Psychoanalyse.*

Göttingen: V & R unipress). I tried to use original English texts or translations

wherever possible.

2. Angehm, Emil. 1991. *Geschichtsphilosophie.* (Grundkurs Philosophie, 15). Stuttgart [et

al.]: Kohlhammer, p. 69. One year before, in 1764, Voltaire used the expression

"philosophie de l'histoire" for the first time in a recension of Hume's *Complete History*

*of England* (Nagl-Docekal, Herta (editor). 1996. *Der Sinn des Historischen.*

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Fischer, p. 7).

3. Voltaire, François-Marie. 1963. *Essai sur les moeurs et l'esprit des tiations et sur les*

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Pomeau. Vol. 2. Paris: Garnier, p. 800.

4. Rohbeck, Johannes. 2004. *Geschichtsphilosophie zur Einßhrung.* (Zur Einführung,

302). Hamburg: Junius, p. 77. See also Droysen, Johann G. 1977. *Historik.* Edited by

Peter Leyh. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, p. 424.

5. Dilthey, Wilhelm. 2002. *The formation of the historical world in the human sciences.*

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N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 237-238.

6. At nearly the same time Nietzsche saw history as a kind of life's servant whose value

resulted only in its meaning for life. Preoccupation with history should, according

to Nietzsche, not be exaggerated as it might prevent the individuum—that, by concerning

itself with that what was, remained mentally in the past—from life.

*{Untimely Meditations II, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,* chapter 3)

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12. Angehrn 1991, p. 123.

13. Marquard, Odo. 1982. *Schwierigkeiten mit der Geschichtsphilosophie.* (Suhrkam